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Governing The Commons

Topics: Governing

Collection: opensource

Language: English

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The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in
common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state
control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither
the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving
common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of
policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here
provides
a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which
common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or
unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most
frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market
solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to
these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions.
In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine
different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the
commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons
argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary
organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases
considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation
communities and other water rights, and fisheries.